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In this article ‘famine’ entails a widespread lack of food leading directly to 
excess mortality from starvation or hunger-induced illnesses.2  In the global history 
of famine so defined, the twentieth century presents a paradox.  On the one hand, it 
saw the disappearance of famine from most of the globe.  On the other, it witnessed 
in China in 1959-61 what probably was, in terms of excess mortality, the greatest 
famine in history.  A recent survey of twentieth-century famines reckons their 
aggregate cost in terms of lives lost at roughly seventy million: less than the toll 
exacted by endemic and epidemic diseases, but roughly as many as by World Wars I 
and II combined (Devereux 2000).  In addition, famines resulted in millions of ‘lost’ 
births and stillbirths, and had potentially significant effects on the physical and 
mental well-being of survivors.   
Until recently, therefore, famines very much mattered.  Almost certainly, in 
earlier centuries they mattered even more in relative terms.  Today’s high-profile 
famines are, by comparison, small.  That in Niger in 2005 pales into insignificance 
compared to one that robbed the same country of up to one-third of its people in 
1931 (Fuglestad 1974).  What was described in 1998 as Sudan’s ‘worst famine in its 
history’ was later deemed to have killed no more than 70,000, and another much-
publicized famine in Malawi in 2002 killed fewer than a thousand  (The Guardian, 
August 22 1998; Devereux 2000, p. 6; Devereux 2001).  By the 1990s famine-induced 
                                                 
2 On the range of alternative definitions proposed see Howe and Devereux 2004; Ravallion 1997, p. 
1205-6. 
  1deaths were confined to poverty-stricken and often war-torn pockets of the globe.  
Perhaps for the first time in human history, eliminating famine should be ‘easy’.  The 
eradication of Malthus’s ultimate check would be a notable achievement for 
mankind.   
The purpose of this article is to review recent contributions to the economics 
and economic history of famine.  Its structure is as follows.  Section II reviews 
alternative explanations of why famines occur and persist.  These are divided into 
factors relating to agricultural shocks and economic context (the frequency and 
impact of crop failures), on the one hand, and those relating to human agency (the 
functioning of markets, war and social upheaval, public action, governance), on the 
other.3  Section III takes up the problems of defining and identifying famines, and 
some methodological issues in studying them.  It argues that while material progress 
and medical technology have undoubtedly reduced the demographic cost of famines, 
their long-term cost in terms of health may be greater than previously realised.  
Section IV briefly re-examines three major twentieth-century famines in the light of 






                                                 
3 The distinction, which is not watertight, echoes that of Walford (1879) between ‘natural’ and 
‘artificial’ causes of famine. 
  2II. Accounting for Famine 
 
II.1. More Likely in Poorer Countries 
Why famines? In the past, vulnerability to famine was usually seen as a 
function of economic backwardness and the weak infrastructure and adverse disease 
environment that backwardness entailed.  Coping mechanisms against harvest 
failure – crop insurance, storage, trade, public action – were lacking, and breakdowns 
in communications and transportation more likely.  Because poverty meant poor 
hygiene and sanitation, most famine victims succumbed to infectious disease rather 
than famine proper.  The deadliness of any given famine depended mainly on the 
severity of a harvest shortfall; private philanthropy and public action might mitigate, 
but rarely overcame, the ensuing hazards. 
United Nations output and welfare indices highlight the close correlation 
between famine and underdevelopment today.  Niger, focus of global media 
attention in 2005, is probably the poorest economy in the world, while GDPs per 
head in Ethiopia and Malawi, also threatened by famine in the new millennium, are 
in real terms less than half that of the United States two centuries ago.  And five of 
the six countries most prone to food emergencies since the mid-1980s – Angola, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, and Afghanistan – were ranked in the bottom ten 
out of 174 on the United Nations’ Human Development Index in the mid-1990s 
(UNDP 1996); the sixth, Sudan, was ranked 146th.  Moreover, within countries 
famines are most severe and slowest to disappear in remoter, densely populated, and 
  3poorly diversified rural regions.4  In Ireland in the 1840s the correlation across 
administrative units between population loss and measures of pre-famine 
backwardness such as housing quality and literacy was very high (Ó Gráda 1999: 30-
33).  Across Bengal’s twenty-six rural divisions in 1942-43 excess mortality and 
population density were also highly correlated.5   
In this context, the extreme backwardness of China on the eve of the Great 
Leap Forward (GLF) famine bears noting.  In 1950 Chinese GDP per head (measured 
in international 1990 dollars) was less than that of any African country in 2003, with 
the exception of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire); and in the 
mid-1950s it was less than half today’s African average.  Chinese GDP per head in 
1950 was also only about one-fourth that of UK GDP per capita in 1820 (of which 
Ireland was an integral part when the potato famine of the 1840s struck) (Maddison 
2006).   
Poverty also helps explain why infectious disease still looms large in famine 
mortality in sub-Saharan Africa today.  It makes the cost of medical care prohibitive; 
more important, the associated remedies are difficult to implement in crisis 
conditions (Mokyr and Ó Gráda 2002).  Even in normal times in sub-Saharan Africa, 
the world’s main remaining famine-prone region, infectious and parasitic diseases 
alone were responsible for nearly half of all deaths in the 1980s, with diarrhoeal 
diseases accounting for nearly one quarter of those (Murray et al. 1994).  In such 
                                                 
4 E.g. north-west England in the 1620s, Anwui and Sichuan in China in the 1950s, northwest Finland in 
the 1860s, North Hamyong province in North Korea in the 1990s. 
5 Using 1931 population data and mortality estimates in Maharatna (1996, pp. 186-7), the associated 
elasticity is 0.57. 
  4areas, diseases endemic in normal times still account for much of the excess mortality 
during famines. 
The availability – at a price – of the technology to prevent and treat diseases 
such as malaria, typhus, and dysentery compounds the anachronistic character of 
present-day famine.  Much of sub-Saharan Africa has yet to experience fully the 
'epidemiological transition'; public health lags rather than leads medical science.  
This is no longer because of ignorance of low-cost primary health care such as 
immunization, prophylactics, and re-hydration, or even because of the lack of 
medical personnel.  Missing are the resources and the political capabilities to put 
what is available locally or obtainable from abroad (through NGOs and international 
institutions) to most effective use. 
 
 
II.2. Crop Failure  
Most famines in poor economies are associated with the impact of extreme 
weather – droughts, excessive rain, or a combination of the two – on the harvest, 
although, as will be shown in the following sections, dramatic crop failures are 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for famine.  Even the ‘man-made’ 
famines in the Soviet Union in 1932-33 (see Section IV.1) and in China in 1959-61 (see 
Section IV.3) were due in part to crop failures.     
However, even the most backward economies often have the resilience to cope 
with once-off harvest shortfalls; in Africa today, ‘a visitor can only see a single year 
  5of drought, and that is not enough to cause famine’ (de Waal 1997: 115).6  
Historically, the worst famines have been the product of back-to-back shortfalls of 
the staple crop.  Ireland offers a well-known example: had phytophthera infestans not 
struck the potato crop twice in a row in 1845 and 1846, there might have been no 
Great Irish Famine.  Other well-known famines associated with back-to-back harvest 
failures include the Great European Famine of the 1310s, the Deccan famine of 1630-
32, the Finnish and Scottish famines of the late 1690s, the Berar famines of the 1890s, 
the Soviet famine of 1932-33, and the Chinese famine of 1959-61.7  Thus, the 
probability of back-to-back poor harvests should provide some sense of the 
likelihood of famine in the past.   
This suggests the strategy of identifying ‘bad’ harvests in historical data as 
those less than some percentage of their expected or trend value, and then calculating 
p(s), the probability of such a shortfall, and p(s).p(s), the likelihood of a back-to-back 
shortfall if such events were random.  The expected and actual incidence of repeat 
failures can then be compared (Solar 1989; Lamb 1995, p. 306).  Back-to-back events 
could spring from ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’ causes.  The former would include the 
effect of serial autocorrelation in the weather (defined by some combination of 
temperature or rainfall), and that of low yield ratios and poor storage capacities.  The 
latter would include war.   
How common were back-to-back poor harvests in the past? Agricultural 
output data offer some insight, although such data are also scarce before the 
                                                 
6 The frequency of famines in the past is discussed in e.g. Iliffe 1990; Caldwell 1998; Boomgaard 2001. 
7 Compare Dyson 2002; Vanhaute, Paping, and Ó Gráda 2006.  
 
  6nineteenth century.  The renowned estate accounts of the medieval bishopric of 
Winchester in southern England provide one straw in the wind: on the assumption 
that yield ratios fifteen percent or more below average implied crisis harvests, the 
accounts for the 1283-1350 period returned only two back-to-back crisis harvests, in 
1315-16 and in 1349-508.  Both were due to excessive rains and flooding (Titow 1960; 
Campbell 2000, p. 366).   
Crop output data are preferable to crop yield data, since the latter fail to take 
account of the likely impact of low yields on acreage sown in the following year 
(compare Rosen 1999).  Table 1 reports the outcome from fitting a range of nineteenth 
and twentieth-century agricultural output data to an appropriate polynomial, and 
then identifying ‘bad’ years as those with shortfalls of over ten or twenty percent.   
The results suggest that such back-to-back events are ‘rare’, although more likely 
than might be expected on a random basis.  Since the underlying patterns are 
unlikely to change much over time, the results may be interpreted as tentative 
evidence that famines were less common in the past than claimed by Malthus.  On 
reflection, this is not implausible: given that life expectancy was low even in non-
crisis years, frequent famines would have made it impossible to sustain population. 
 
 
                                                 
8 In 1349, in the wake of the Black Death, corn seems to have been plentiful despite the low yields (Farr 
1846: 164). 
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Table 1.  Back-to-back Harvest Shortfalls 






Country  Period  Crop  Actual      Ratio  Actual      Ratio 
India  1875-1970  Wheat    .000        0.0    .   
India  1875-1970  Barley    .052      10.0    .       
India  1875-1970  Rice    .0247        4.5    .123       4.9 
          
Madagascar  1923-1988  Maize    .077        3.4    .200       1.6 
                  
Algeria  1875-1970  Wheat    .000        0.0    .0625       3.5 
Algeria  1875-1970  Barley    .052      10.0    .115       4.1 
          
          
Egypt  1909-1988  Wheat    .000         0.0    .050       1.1 
Egypt  1909-1988  Maize    .0125         8.9    .0875       2.5 
Egypt  1909-1988  Rice    .125         0.6    .2125       1.7 
          
France  1815-1914  Wheat     .010         1.5    .040        0.9   
France  1815-1914  Potatoes     .040         3.3     .090       2.0 
          
Germany  1846-1914  Rye     .000        0.0     .029       1.1     
Germany  1846-1914  Wheat     .000        0.0     .029       1.2 
Germany  1846-1914  Barley    .0145      17.3     .058       2.3   
Germany  1846-1914  Oats    .0145        2.8     .0145       0.6 
Germany  1846-1914  Potatoes     .000        0.0     .0435       0.7 
 
Note: Ratio is the ratio of actual to ‘expected’ frequencies.  The data are taken from 
Mitchell 1975 and Mitchell 1995. 
 
 
Since most harvest shortfalls are caused by extreme weather, meteorological 
evidence is also worth considering.  Monthly mean temperature data are available 
for central England since 1659 (Manley 1974).  Temperature was subject to serial 
correlation: running the annual average on its lagged value and a time trend gives a 
coefficient of +0.204 (t = 3.71) over the 1660-1980 period.  However, extreme 
  8temperatures matter more for harvests than annual averages, and when the focus is 
switched from average temperature to the coldest and the warmest months of each 
year, the autocorrelation disappears.  For the mean minimum temperature, the 
coefficient on the lagged term is –0.025 (t = -0.45); for the mean maximum 
temperature, the coefficient is +0.076 (t = 1.36).  Moreover, the probability of back-to-
back bad years is more relevant than the mere incidence of autocorrelation.  Fitting 
mean temperature series to a three-degree polynomial, and defining ‘bad’ years as 
those deviating by more than ten percent from expected values, gives the following 
probabilities and actual frequencies of back-to-back ‘bad’ years of extreme cold or 
heat: 
     Low   High 
Expected    .00513   .0039 
Actual     .0062   0 
 
There were only two incidents of back-to-back cold years over the whole period9 -- in 
1694-95 and 1697-98 -- and none where the temperatures were more than ten percent 
above trend in both.  Indian monsoon rainfall data tell a similar story.  The 
frequencies of drought and flood years (defined as those at least one standard 
deviation less or more than the average) between 1871 and 2002 in both India as a 
whole and in the north-western state of Rajasthan are described in Table 2, along 
with the number of back-to-back extreme events.  In general, all the probabilities 
were low. 
                                                 
9 These two episodes might well be considered part of a single prolonged crisis.  The 1690s were a 
decade of hardship and famine in much of north-western Europe.  In Scotland they were remembered 
as the ‘ill years’. 
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TABLE 2.  Extreme Droughts and Floods in India, 1871-2002 
Area Drought  Flood 
India Frequency  Back-to-back  Frequency  Back-to-back 
India  20 1 18  2 
E.  Rajasthan  21  0  20  5 





II.3. Entitlements  
Political institutions and wars often blur the link between living standards and 
famines, however.  In nineteenth-century India and Ireland, for example, concerns 
about moral hazard constrained famine relief and increased mortality (Hall-
Matthews 2005; Gray 1997).  Wars have exacerbated famine throughout history; to 
take a recent example, in 1944-5 wartime occupation resulted in a famine in the 
western Netherlands, where productivity was quadruple that of Malawi or Niger 
today.  Moreover, in the twentieth century totalitarianism greatly increased the cost 
of policy mistakes and mayhem wrought by governments.  When famine struck the 
former Soviet Union in 1931-33, its GDP per head was about three times that of the 
most famine-prone countries in Africa today (Maddison 2006).  On the eve of a 
serious famine in the mid-1990s, North Korea was at a similar advantage relative to 
those same African countries.  On the other hand, better communications and the 
globalization of relief mean that Africa’s most backward economies today face far 
fewer risks than equally poor countries in the past.  Such examples highlight the 
  10impact of governance and human agency on the occurrence of famines and their 
effective relief – and on the likelihood of their prevention in the future.  
Recent famines differ from historic famines in two other important respects.  
First, as highlighted by Amartya Sen (1981), is the enhanced role of distributional 
shifts or entitlement losses, rather than output declines per se, in producing famine.  
Sen’s work has prompted research on the functioning of food markets during 
famines, and on broader issues of governance and optimal relief policy.  A second 
change in the nature of famines concerns the shifting importance of starvation 
relative to disease as the immediate cause of death.  Effective public health systems, 
once in place, have probably reduced famine deaths overall, while increasing the 
proportion of excess deaths attributable to literal starvation. 
Wars, blockades, poor governance, and civil unrest can also lead to famines; 
panics about the food supply and poorly performing markets can exacerbate them.  
In such cases, as Amartya Sen (1981) has argued, factors other than crop shortfalls 
reduce the purchasing power or ‘entitlements’ of vulnerable sections of the 
population: the size of the loaf matters less than its distribution. 
The claim that even during famines there is usually enough food around to 
feed everyone is not new.  An official inquiry into the Indian famine of 1860-61 
described Indian famines as ‘famines of work [more] than of food’, while according 
to the 1880 Famine Commission: ‘...as a general rule, there is abundance of food 
procurable, even in the worst districts in the worst times; but when men who, at the 
best, merely live from hand to mouth, are deprived of their means of earning wages, 
they starve not from the impossibility of getting food, but for want of the necessary 
  11money to buy it’ (cited in de Waal 1997, p. 22; see too Davis 2001, p. 27).  Such 
statements make the case for food redistribution mechanisms, but there is no 
denying that Food Availability Declines (or FADs) also played a part in those same 
and other famines (Sharma 2001; Chakrabarti 2004). Ironically, in the paradigmatic 
case of Bengal in 1943-44 the state of crops and food supplies remains controversial.   
Ellman’s adaptation of Sen’s model to an analysis of the frequently overlooked 
Soviet famine of 1946-7 distinguishes between FAD1 and FAD2 famines.  Mortality 
during FAD1 famines is largely unavoidable, whereas alternative policies could 
prevent or reduce the mortality associated with FAD2 famines.  By this reckoning the 
1946-7 famine, coming in the wake of a harvest one-sixth below its already low 1945 
level, was in the FAD2 category.  Although the global shortage of cereals in 1946-7 
probably ruled out the option of seeking supplies from abroad, all or most of the 
resultant 1.2 million deaths could have been prevented by relaxing procurements 
and halting exports.  Although most of the Soviet Union experienced privation, the 
epicentre of the ‘provisioning problems’ of 1946-47 was in Moldova where they led 
to the deaths of about five percent of the population (Ellman 2000, p. 617 fn1; 
Zubkova 1996, pp. 40-50).  
The entitlements approach to famine reverses the relative importance of 
nature and human action posited by Malthusian analysis.  It highlights the impact of 
human agency on the distribution of food.  Yet, on closer inspection, it turns out that 
even ‘man-made’ famines in the Soviet Union in 1932-3 (on which more below) and 
in China in 1959-61 contained significant FAD elements.  The paucity of evidence for 
‘pure’ entitlement famines – famines with no FAD dimension -- suggests that modern 
  12scholarship may underestimate the role of food supply.  It also bears noting that to 
the extent that a ‘pure’ entitlements famine is akin to a zero-sum game, the gainers 
and their gains should be readily identifiable. 
 
 
II.4. War, Totalitarianism and Famine 
   Today, given good will on all sides, famine prevention should be ‘easy’.  
Transport costs have plummeted since the nineteenth century, information travels 
fast, storage is inexpensive, international disaster relief agencies are ubiquitous, 
nutritional requirements and medical remedies are better understood (Jacks 2005).  
The combination certainly reduced the incidence and duration of famine in the 
twentieth century.  Why, then, did and does famine persist?  A feature of twentieth 
century famines is that excess mortality was more often linked with wars and civil 
strife than with harvest shortfalls per se: familiar examples include the Soviet Union 
(1918-22), Bengal (1943-44), Vietnam (1945-46), and Ethiopia (1984-85).   Warfare 
impedes both production and trade; the accompanying breakdown in social order 
and forced migrations may lead to the spread of epidemic diseases.  In these and 
several other instances, human action matters more than, or greatly exacerbates, acts 
of nature.   
A distinguishing feature of the past century is that the rise of totalitarianism 
greatly increased the cost of policy mistakes and the damage wrought by 
government.  What Adam Smith (1976 [1776], p. 526) claimed, incorrectly, for 
famines in early modern Europe – that they never arose ‘from any other cause but 
  13the violence of government attempting, by improper means, to remedy the 
inconveniences of a dearth’ – rings much truer for the twentieth century than the 
seventeenth or eighteenth.  In the 1930s and again in the 1950s, not only did 
totalitarian regimes engage in policies that placed millions at risk, but they also 
managed to keep the consequences of their actions largely hidden from the outside 
world (Engerman 2000).  Analyses of twentieth-century famines accordingly have 
tended to dwell less on economic factors such as the background level of 
development and the extent of the crop shortfall, and highlight instead the role of 
human agency – be it the ruthlessness of warlords or the incompetence of 
officialdom.   
Sen’s reminder that famine and democracy are virtually incompatible is a 
special case of the more general claim that democratic institutions promote economic 
justice and reduce inequality (Sen 2001; e.g. Rivera-Batiz 2002; Glaeser et al. 2004).  
Democratization reduces the incidence of famine by speeding up the spread of 
information and criticism, by reducing corruption, and by penalizing governments 
that fail to avert disasters and prevent excess mortality.  Public action may be rarely 
disinterested, but democratization buttresses general accountability, and forces elites 
to contribute more to saving lives.   
Exceptions to Sen’s rule seem few:  Ireland in the 1840s (restricted franchise 
and a free press), India in 1972-3 (when famine produced an estimated 130,000 
deaths in Maharashtra), and Niger in 2005 (semi-democracy) are marginal examples.  
Banik’s analysis of press reports of starvation deaths in Kalahandi in the Indian state 
of Orissa confirms Sen’s findings insofar as famines are concerned, but highlights the 
  14inability of a free press and collective action to prevent mass malnutrition and ‘many, 
many deaths’ (Banik 2002). 
An added complication is that in poverty-stricken, ethnically divided, low-
literacy economies democracy may not be sustainable.  Nonetheless, the exogenous 
element in democratic institutions surely matters.  Meanwhile evidence on the 
progress of democratization and economic deregulation in Africa in the recent past is 
mixed, but on balance positive.  Between 2000 and 2005, the widely used ‘Freedom 
Index’ rose in 28 out of 40 African countries and between 1995 and 2000, it rose in 16 
out of 28 cases documented, while between 1980 and 2003 the average of the ‘Polity 
Index’ (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/), a measure of good governance, for the 




II.5. Markets and Famines 
Economists have long argued that since crop failures nearly always vary in 
intensity across regions and countries and, as noted above, major back-to-back 
failures are few, spatial and intertemporal arbitrage should help mitigate or reduce 
the cost of famines (Persson 1999; Smith 1976: 524-30).  However, natural (poor 
communications) and artificial obstacles (war, trade restrictions and price controls, 
civil unrest) have often impeded the scope for arbitrage.  Collective resistance (as in 
Ireland in 1846-7 and in France in 1709) and local administrators (as in different 
Indian provinces in 1943) may seek to protect consumers in would-be exporting 
regions.   
  15Research on Bengal in 1942-44 and Bangladesh in 1974-75 shows that food 
markets worked poorly in these instances, in the double sense of inadequate regional 
arbitrage and ‘excessive’ hoarding on the part of producers and traders.  Sen (1981) 
found that farmers and grain merchants had converted a 'moderate short-fall in 
production... into an exceptional short-fall in market release' (emphases in original).  
The famine was due in large part to 'speculative withdrawal and panic purchase of 
rice stocks... encouraged by administrative chaos'.  Such speculation exacerbated the 
deterioration in the exchange entitlements of the poor, already hit by inflationary 
rises in the price of food.  Ravallion’s study of Bangladesh in 1974-75 broadly 
corroborated Sen’s findings for Bengal, and found that excess mortality in 
Bangladesh was ‘in no small measure, the effect of a speculative crisis’.  Rice prices 
rose dramatically because merchants badly underestimated a harvest that turned out 
to be normal.  Ravallion also found evidence of ‘significant impediments’ to trade 
between the capital city, Dhaka, and its main sources of supply during this famine 
(Ravallion 1987a, pp. 19, 111-3; 1997, pp. 1219-21; Becker and Quddus 2000; Ahmed, 
Haggblade, and Chowdhury 2002).   
The Law of One Price (LOP) implies that, as long as transport costs remain 
constant, the variation in food prices across markets should decline during famines.  
Figure 1[a] describes the variation in rice prices across Bengal between January 1942 
and August 1943.  It suggests that, given the disruption of traffic due to wartime 
restrictions, markets became more segmented during the famine, but only marginally 
  16so, apart from brief intervals in November 1942 and March 1943.10  Figure 2[b] 
describes quite a different outcome in Bangladesh three decades later: the spike in 
the standard deviation in late 1974 and early 1975 reflects the balkanisation of 
markets at the height of the crisis.  
 


















                                                 
10 Figure 2a refers to the coefficient of variation, to adjust for wartime inflation.  The Bengali data are 
taken from the Pinnell Papers (British Library, India Office Records, Mss. Eur. D911/8, ‘Further 
information desired by the Commission on 3rd Sept 1944: Prices’); the Bangladeshi data are taken from 
Alamgir (1977). 
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The evidence from sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s is also of interest.  Drèze 
and Sen’s comparison of markets in famine-threatened Botswana and Kenya in the 
early 1980s shows that across eighteen markets in Botswana, where the average price 
of maize meal rose from 3.53 to 4.74 pula per bag between August 1980 and April 
1983, the standard deviation fell from 0.25 to 0.23, whereas across eighteen markets 
in Kenya, where the average retail price of maize rose from 2.42 to 4.61 Kenyan 
shillings per kilo between January and November 1984, the standard deviation 
increased from 0.36 to 2.07 (Drèze and Sen 1989, pp. 138-46, 152-58). 
According to Webb and von Braun (1994, pp. 47-55; see too von Braun, Teklu, 
and Webb 1999, Ch. 6) famines in Sudan and Ethiopia in the mid-1980s were also 
exacerbated by weak spatial market integration.  In normal times in Ethiopia prices 
  18moved in tandem, but in the mid-1980s and again in 1988 the prices of sorghum and 
teff (the staple crop of the Ethiopian highlands) in Dessie, capital of Wollo province, 
soared above prices in other regional capitals.  Von Braun and Webb link such 
anomalies to restrictions on private traders, buttressed by quotas and roadblocks.   
Trends in the spreads of teff and sorghum prices across Ethiopia in 1981-85 tell a 
slightly different story, however.  The rise in the coefficient of variation of teff prices 
across ten of Ethiopia’s provinces, from an average of 0.24 in 1981-83 to 0.28 in 1984 
and 0.34 in 1985 was significant, but less than that occurring in Kenya over roughly 
the same years.  The coefficient of variation of sorghum prices changed little during 
the same period: 0.43 in 1981-83, 0.41 in 1984, and 0.45 in 1985 (derived from Kumar 
1990: 200-01).  
Formal studies of how markets worked during pre-twentieth century famines 
are few, although evidence from nineteenth-century Ireland and Finland and from 
ancien régime France suggests that they functioned no worse than in normal times (Ó 
Gráda and Chevet 2002; Ó Gráda 2005).  These studies employ annual and monthly 
price data to estimate (i) whether famines led to increasing price dispersion between 
regions; (ii) whether markets were slower to adjust to disequilibria during famines; 
(iii) whether markets systematically overestimated the harvest shortfall in times of 
famine, and therefore led to excessive storage.   
On the evidence of these famines, in pre-industrial Europe, the variation in 
prices either fell or, at most, rose little.  Moreover, monthly price data from a range of 
French, Finnish, and Irish towns imply strong co-movements between pairs of 
markets in crisis years and, in general, speeds of adjustment to disequilibria no 
  19slower than in non-crisis years.  Finally, the particularly sharp seasonal price rises 
recorded during famines in pre-industrial Europe fail to support the view that 
producers and traders held back supplies early in the season in the hopes that prices 
would rise later. 11  The asymmetry in speculators’ expectations implied by the 
findings of Sen and Ravallion —over-pessimism in the event of a harvest shortfall—
is absent in the data (Ó Gráda 2005).  Why did markets work ‘better’ in nineteenth-
century Ireland and Finland than in twentieth-century Bengal and Bangladesh?  A 
key difference is the political context: Bangladesh was emerging from civil war in 
1974-75, while Bengal was under threat of invasion in 1943-44. 
That is not to say that markets worked like clockwork in pre-industrial Europe 
— far from it — merely that their responses to spatial and intertemporal disequilibria 
were no slower than in non-crisis times.  In practice, markets may adjust too slowly: 
in the mid-nineteenth century, for example, before the telegraph and long-distance 
bulk carriage by steamship could have made the difference, global grain markets 
could not prevent mass mortality in Ireland and India (Ravallion 1987b; Ó Gráda 
1999, pp. 143-46; see too Mallory 1926, pp. 29-30).  Nor does this mean that well-
functioning, integrated markets always benefit the poor: as Sen’s classic contribution 
emphasizes, it is easy to imagine how they might allow inhabitants of less-affected 
areas, endowed with the requisite purchasing power, to attract food away from 
famine-threatened areas.  Much depends on the extent to which such exports are 
used to finance cheaper imported substitutes (e.g. maize for wheat), and on the speed 
with which food markets adjust.  Dogmatic generalizations are not warranted. 
                                                 
11  The same could be argued for the failure of prices to plummet below their pre-famine 
norm as hoarded stocks were sold off. 
  20Free markets may mitigate the impact of famines in two other respects.  First, 
migration arguably limits the damage wrought by poor harvests, since the migrants 
reduce the pressure on scarce food and medical resources where the crisis is 
deepest.12  This is probably true even when the poorest lack the resources to migrate.  
In Ireland in the 1840s, emigration to America was a particularly appropriate form of 
famine relief, given the large and permanent productivity shock to agriculture.  It 
was hardly ideal, insofar as it did not help those most at risk directly, but famine 
mortality would surely have been higher without it, with more people competing for 
scarce food supplies.  In addition, some migration would have been diverted to the 
already crowded cities of Ireland and Great Britain. Migration undoubtedly exacted a 
cost in terms of the spread of infectious disease in host countries, but on balance it 
saved lives (Ó Gráda and O’Rourke 1997).   
Second— as first emphasized by eighteenth-century French economists — the 
regional specialization that follows free trade increases aggregate output, with a 
resultant reduction in the risks attendant on any proportionate harvest shortfall.  
Increasing commercialization also means better spatial and intertemporal arbitration 
in the markets for food.  The latter is evident in the data from Pisa and England 
describing year-to-year differences in the natural log of wheat prices over several 
centuries prior to 1800 (Figures 2a-2b).13  The implied reduction in the cost of holding 
carry-over stocks and of transport greatly reduced the vulnerability of the Italian and 
the English poor in the early modern era (compare Persson 1999). 
                                                 
12 Forced migration, such as that associated with the Soviet Gulag in 1932-33, has the opposite effect 
(Khlevniuk 2004, pp. 68-82). 
13 The price data are taken from Clark 2003 [England]; Malanima n.d. [Pisa]. 
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  22II.7. Government Action 









                                                
Throughout histo
pt a degree of responsibility to those at risk during famines.14  Most analytical 
attention has focused on how relief from the central authorities has been allocated, 
rather than how much relief was given.  Since human interventions almost always 
give rise to principal-agent problems, choosing the appropriate yardstick for effecti
famine relief is an abiding issue.  In the past, because governing elites were remote 
from those at risk15, they often relied on sub-bureaucracies and landowners to 
identify worthy recipients of relief.  History is full of examples of trade-offs bet
red tape, on the one hand, and corrupt agents, on the other (Ó Gráda 2007, ch. 6).  
Consider Qing China, where the venal and rapacious character of village chiefs wa
taken as given by the central government; for relief to have any hope of success, the 
central bureaucracy needed to bypass them at local level (Will 1990, pp. 94-7, 120-1). 
At first sight, the finding that during the Kangxi emperor’s reign (1662-1722) the size 
of a province’s grain stocks varied inversely with the amount of relief granted 
suggests a well-functioning relief mechanism responding to the scale of shortag
facing the provinces and their relative backwardness.  It turns out, however, that in
crisis after crisis the provinces receiving relief were most likely the richest (Shiue 
2004, 2005).  The central bureaucracy relied on corrupt local agents to identify and
 
14 However, some famines stem from a determination not to transfer relief to targeted groups.  
Famines resulting from scorched earth warfare fall into this category:  so are famines caused or 
exacerbated by narrow dogmatic visions of a better life for future generations at the expense of the 
present – be they in Ireland in the 1840s or in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. 
15 In urban settings, where the threat of food riots during famines was real, the challenges were 
different. 
  23relieve those most at risk, and the resultant allocation reflected a moral hazard 
problem arising out of asymmetric information.  Periodic monitoring of grain st
and penalties against officials mitigated the problem but did not eliminate it.  










famine of the 1840s highlight the mismanagement 
of the public works, the impossible burden placed on local taxpayers, and the 
                                                
problems has been amply discussed in Drèze and Sen (1989), Ravallion (1997),
elsewhere.16  Transfers of food at below market prices may risk corruption and 
hoarding; hence the frequent focus on the provision of non-tradable and highly 
perishable food rations.  Income transfers (e.g. through wages paid on public wo
schemes) are less likely to distort food markets, though if linked to work 
performance, they discriminate against those in most need.  Public works
also risk spreading infectious disease.  A further problem with public works is that 
fiscal stringency or fears of distorting labor markets, as in Ireland in the 1840s and in
southern India in the 1870s, may entail below-subsistence wages and consequent 
excess mortality (Hall-Matthews 2005, pp. 192, 204; McGregor 2004; compare Gray
1997).  In India, mass mortality in 1896-7 and 1899-1900 was also in part the product
of fiscal parsimony and penal wages earned on relief works (Maharatna 1996: 15; 
Bhatia 1967: 256-57; Davis 2001: 157-63).  The rhetoric of famine relief policy soften
thereafter, and Ortega Osona (2001) attributes the reduction in year-to-year 
fluctuations in mortality in Bengal after 1900 to a combination of better weat
more effective social safety nets. 
Local histories of the Irish 
 











 mid-1847 are deemed to have been more successful than the public 
ore 
y 
ing conditions facing workhouse inmates (e.g. Ó Murchadha 1997; Eiríksson 
1997).  Measurable yardsticks of workhouse performance are available: a poorl
managed workhouse might have been relatively slow to begin admitting paupers; o
might have been associated with relatively high mortality from infectious disease
a high overall death rate; or its executive board might have been dissolved for 
incompetence.  High mortality from infectious diseases meant either that conditions 
in the workhouses deterred the destitute from entering until they were already
else that they became infected in the workhouse.  In either case workhouse 
managements were culpable.  During the famine nearly one board in four was 
dissolved, mainly for failing to collect taxes required for workhouse upkeep
However, the ‘success’ of a workhouse was also a function of location: the incid
of disease varied by location and boards relied on local taxes, which were easie
collect in, say, Belfast than in the devastated west.  In an econometric analysis of 
workhouse management, Guinnane and Ó Gráda (2002) model the likelihood of a 
board being dissolved as a function of a range of economic and locational variabl
The outcome suggests that some boards were unfairly dissolved for the severity of 
conditions beyond their control, while other poorly-performing boards were 
indulged.   
  In Ireland the soup kitchens that fed more than one-third of the popula
their peak in
works or the workhouses in saving lives (Ó Gráda 1999, pp. 72-73).  In Bengal in 
1943-44, where soup kitchens were the main means of relief, their reputation is m
controversial.  The rough, disorderly ethos of official soup kitchens deterred man
  25women and children from attending, and the food supplied was of little nutritional 
value in any case (Greenough 1982, pp. 127-38).  In Bengal delays in relief supplies 




.8.  NGOs and International Aid  
The globalization of disaster relief highlighted by Live Aid and the response 




ce of a rival NGO on the basis that ‘inasmuch the life of the 
organi
y 
                                                
II
to the Asian tsunami of Decembe
he end of World War II the number of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) specialising in emergency and development aid has mushroomed (Iriye 
2002).17  NGOs have been effective at highlighting the link between Third Worl
poverty and the risk of famine, and have excelled at fund-raising in the wake of 
highly publicized crises.  Nonetheless, their record in mitigating and averting fam
raises several issues.   
In a dispute about famine relief in China in the 1920s the American Red Cross 
criticized the permanen
zation depends on receipts from relief contributions there must always exist, 
perhaps unconsciously, an urge to discover in every period of serious crop deficienc
a reason for calling on the public for contributions’.  It also berated its rival for 
diverting funds originally raised for famine relief to uses not intended by donors 
 
17 In late 2005, an internet directory targeting NGOs and development research organizations 
worldwide listed 47,500 organizations (private, public, academic) with an interest in development 
(www.devdir.org).  Membership of British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) numbered 295, 
while an internet site for employment in the development field (devjobsmail.com) receives 145,000 
visits monthly.  














                                                
18  The tendency for agencies originally founded as vehicles f
famine relief to re-invent themselves as bureaucracies is exemplified by Oxfam, 
which began as a Quaker-inspired committee to relieve famine in Greece in 1941-42, 
and by Concern International, formed during the Biafran war-famine of 1968.  Su
organizations must balance the public’s wish to relieve disasters as they happen with
their own need for bureaucratic sustainability.  This has entailed focusing more on 
development than on famine relief per se.  Budgetary pressures have also tempted 
NGOs to exaggerate the risks or gravity of famine, as in the Horn of Africa in 2000, 
Southern Africa in 2002, and in Niger in 2005, or to claim the credit when the crisis
‘averted’ (Howe and Devereux 2004).  Given the likely long-term costs of such tactics, 
and the increasing dependence of NGOs on public funding in the recent past, 
independent monitoring of their activities is essential (Iriye 2002, p. 207).   
Typically, NGO interventions lag, rather than lead, media reports; instea
drawing on previously accumulated reserves, they rely on crises to solicit a
crisis of 2004/5 is a good case in point.  Before the end of 2004 the US-funded 
Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) had already listed Niger as ‘requiring urgent
attention’ and the Niger authorities had a ‘national emergency plan’ in place.  The 
UN’s World Food Programme drew attention to the unfolding crisis in March 2005, 
but failed to attract donors.  In April Médecins sans Frontières was the first NGO to
warn of the crisis, which FEWS upgraded to an ‘emergency’ in June.  Media coverage
 
18 Compare Stephanie Strom, ‘Poor Nations Complain Not All Charity Reaches Victims’, New York 
Times, 29 January 2006. 
  27in July resulted in a stampede of NGOs towards Niger, but it was August before food
and medical supplies began to reach the affected regions in volume.  By late 2005 
millet prices had fallen by almost half from their summer peak, and the ratio of 
livestock to cereal prices – a measure of the terms of trade facing vulnerable 
pastoralists -- had risen significantly.  A crisis that had been described in July-Au
2005 as one of gargantuan proportions that threatened to starve 0.8 million pe
death had virtually evaporated (FEWS 2005). 
Moreover, NGOs’ over-reliance on emergency-generated funding has led 










                                                
ve famine relief.  Most NGOs continue to spread themselves too thin, and a
too small to offer the insurance required for a rapid response against famine.  Both 
the Emergency Response Fund of $500 million sanctioned by the UN General 
Assembly in December 2005, and the trial scheme approved by the World Food 
Program in November 2005 to use weather derivatives or ‘catastrophe bonds’ a
means of shielding at-risk countries against unlikely but high-impact weather ev
implicitly acknowledge the limitations of the fire-brigade methods of international 




19 The scheme is explained in detail at http://www.wfp.org/eb/docs/2005/wfp077056~3.pdf. 
  28III. Famine Characteristics 
 
 
III.1. Counting the Dead 
Soaring food prices and poor harvests are often harbingers of famine, but they 
are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for one.  On the one hand, appropriate 
relief policies may prevent famine; on the other, as discussed above, not all famines 
result from aggregate food deficits or inflated food prices.  An abnormal jump in 
mortality is a more reliable signal of famine, and is often regarded as its defining 
feature.   
For most historical famines, however, establishing excess mortality with any 
precision is impossible,20 and inferences derived from incomplete data are often 
controversial.  Compare the 150,000 ‘famine related’ deaths conceded by the 
Governor of Bombay in 1876-78 with the five million revealed by an official inquiry 
in the wake of the crisis; or the claim by the Secretary of State for India at the height 
of the Bengali famine of 1943-44 that the weekly death toll was about one thousand – 
although ‘it might be higher’ – at a time when the true figure was about forty 
thousand.  Subsequent estimates of mortality in Bengal range from 0.8 million to 3.8 
million; today the scholarly consensus is about 2.1 million (Hall-Matthews 2005, pp. 
204-05; Sen 1981, pp. 195-196; Maharatna 1996, Table 4.1).  In the case of the North 
Korean famine of the 1990s a toll of three million, or one-seventh of the entire 
                                                 
20 For example, only the crudest guess is possible for Ireland in 1740-41, when mortality may have 
matched or exceeded that in the 1840s in relative terms.  In the absence of civil registration, as in the 
case of the Great Irish Famine of the 1840s, estimates of excess mortality simply subtract post-famine 
population from a counterfactual based on assumed non-crisis birth, death, and emigration rates 
(Mokyr 1980; Ó Gráda 1999, pp. 84-88).   
  29population, gained wide currency, but the true figure seems to be well under one 
million (Woo 2006; Smith 2005, pp. 73-74).  
Even more controversial are estimates of excess famine mortality in the Soviet 
Union in the early 1930s and in China in 1959-61.  In the Soviet case, research based 
on archival material released in the 1990s has revised estimates of mortality in 1931-
33 downwards somewhat, from the 7 million claimed by Robert Conquest to between 
4 million (Adamets 2002, pp. 165-68) and 5-6 million (Davies et al. 1994, p. 77; Davies 
and Wheatcroft 2004, pp. 412-15).  Much hinges on assumptions about the under-
registration of deaths at the time. Academic estimates of excess mortality in China in 
1959-61 range from 15 million to 43 million (Ashton et al. 1984; Yao 1999; Houser, 
Sands, and Xiao 2005).  
Table 3, which reports estimated death toll from several well-known famines, 
suggests that today’s famines are, relatively speaking, far less costly in terms of 
human lives than earlier famines.  Although non-crisis death rates in Africa remain 
high, excess mortality from famines in recent decades has been low.  In Devereux’s 
useful listing of major twentieth-century African famines only two – Nigeria in 1968-
70 and Ethiopia in 1983-85 – are accorded tolls nearing one million (Devereux 2000), 
while in the Sahel in the early 1970s, in Darfur in the mid-1980s, and in Bahr el 
Ghazal (Sudan) in 1998, deaths were far fewer.   
Note too the implications of focusing on relative rather than absolute 
mortality.  The excess death rate of 23 per thousand in China in 1959-6121 is modest 
compared to that of 120 per thousand in Ireland in the 1840s or 70 per thousand in 
Finland in 1867-8.  The lower rate matters to the extent that it affected the 
                                                 
21 On which more in Section IV.3 below. 
  30characteristics of the famine, in terms of the proximate causes of death, the threat of 
social disorder, and other famine symptoms. Table 3 also begs the question of the 
appropriate denominator.  Most of these famines were regionally concentrated, but 
the denominators refer to larger political or geographical units.  Finally, note that 
most famines lasted a year or two at most, Ireland in the 1840s, Cambodia in the 
1970s, and possibly North Korea in the 1990s being exceptional in this respect. 
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Table 3.  Estimated Death Tolls from Selected Famines 






1693-4 France  1.5  7 Poor  harvests 
1740-1 Ireland  0.3  13  Cold  weather 
1846-52  Ireland  1  12  Potato blight; policy failure 
1868 Finland  0.1  7  Poor  harvests 
1877-9  China  9.5 to 13  3  Drought, floods 
1876-79  India  7  3  Drought, policy failure 
1921-22  USSR  9  6  Drought, civil war 
1927  China  3 to 6  1  Natural disasters 
1932-3  USSR  5 to 6  4  Stalinism; harvest shortfall 
1942-4  Bengal  2  3  War; policy failure; supply 
shortfall 
1946-7  Soviet Union  1.2  0.7  Poor harvest, policy failure 
1959-61  China  15  2  Drought, floods; Great 
Leap Forward 
1972-73 India  0.1  0.03 Drought 
1974-5  Bangladesh  0.5  0.5  War, floods, harvest 
shortfall 
1972-3  Ethiopia  0.06  0.2  Drought; poor governance 
1975-9  Cambodia  0.5 to 0.8  7 to 11  Human agency  
1980-1 Uganda  0.03  0.3  Drought,  conflict 
1984-5 Sudan  0.25  1 Drought 
1985-6  Ethiopia  0.6 to 1  2  War; human agency; 
drought 
1991-2  Somalia  0.3  4  Drought, civil war 
1998 Sudan  (Bahr 
el Ghazal) 
0.07 0.2  Drought 
1995-2000  North Korea  0.6 to 1  3 to 4  Poor harvests; policy 
failure 
2002 Malawi Negligible  0  Drought 
2005 Niger  Negligible  0  Drought 
       
 
Sources: Lachiver 1991, p. 480; de Waal 1997, p. 106; Devereux 2001, p. 6; 




  32Although famine had virtually disappeared from Europe by the mid-
nineteenth century, thirty million is a conservative estimate of famine mortality in 
India and China alone between 1870 and about 1900, and ‘fifty million might not be 
unrealistic’ (Paping, Vanhaute, and Ó Gráda 2006; Maharatna 1996, p. 15; Davis 2001, 
p. 7).  A world total of one hundred million during the nineteenth century as a whole 
is not inconceivable.  Therefore, given that global population rose from about 1.3 
billion in 1870 to 2.5 billion in 1950 (Maddison 2006), in relative terms famines were 
much more lethal in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth.   
The late nineteenth century saw a reduction in famine intensity in India, due 
to a combination of better communications and improvements in relief policy; in 
Russia too famines became more localized.  Japan, where famines were common in 
the seventeenth century, and less so in the eighteenth, experienced its last true 
famine in the 1830s (McAlpin 1983; Maharatna 1996, pp. 272-73; Mallory 1926, pp. 29-




III.2. Disease versus Starvation 
Although lack of food is the ultimate cause of most famine mortality, 
infectious diseases rather than literal starvation usually account for most famine 
deaths.  Two broad classes of causes account for most deaths. The first are those 
directly related to nutrition, including actual starvation.  Most victims of this class 
succumb to nutritionally sensitive diseases brought on by impaired immunity, or to 
poisoning from inferior or unfamiliar foods, rather than to literal starvation.  The 
  33second class of causes is indirect: it stems from the disruption of personal life and 
societal breakdown attendant on famine.  Disease spreads with the increased 
mobility of the poor and the inevitable deterioration in sanitary conditions.  Famines 
are also associated with outbreaks of seemingly unrelated diseases such as cholera, 
influenza, and malaria.   
Cross-section evidence from the Great Irish Famine (see Table 4 for a 
comparison of the relatively prosperous province of Ulster with impoverished 
Connacht) points to three lessons about the causes of excess mortality (Mokyr and Ó 
Gráda 2002).  First, it suggests that the graver the crisis the higher was the incidence 
of starvation and dysentery-diarrhoea, and the more likely were they to have been 
the proximate causes of death.  Second, although the incidence of fever increased 
sharply in the worst hit regions, the proportion of famine deaths due to ‘fever’ 
tended to be fairly constant across the island.  Third, all categories of disease 
contributed to excess mortality.22
                                                 
22 The incidence of the different causes of famine mortality also varies by age and gender.  In Ireland 
in the 1840s nearly half of all reported deaths from starvation and one-third of deaths from 
diarrhoea/dysentery were of children aged less than ten years, compared to only one-fifth of those 
succumbing to ‘fever’, while females accounted for 50.4 percent of cholera victims and 47.1 percent of 
‘fever’ deaths, but only 41.4 percent of deaths from starvation and 42.7 percent of diarrhoea/dysentery 
deaths.   
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Table 4. Main Causes of Excess Deaths in Ireland in 1846-50 (%) 
Cause      Ulster  Connacht 
    
Hunger sensitive:       20.2       26.5 
  Dysentery/Diarrhoea         11.8         16.3 
  Starvation           2.4           5.2 
  Dropsy           2.3           1.9 
  Marasmus           3.8           3.2 
    
Partially hunger sensitive:       49.7       40.4 
  Consumption         10.0           5.8 
  Others         39.7         34.5 
    
Not very hunger sensitive:       30.1       33.1 
  Fever         19.3         23.7 
  Cholera           2.3           3.7 
  Infirmity, old age           8.5           5.7 
    
Total     100.0      100.0 
    
Source: Mokyr and Ó Gráda 2002 
 
 
How the relative importance of starvation and disease may vary during 
famines is illustrated by the contrasting patterns in Leningrad (today’s St. 
Petersburg) and Bengal during World War II.   The Leningrad famine -- the biggest 
ever in an industrialised urban setting -- was the more intense of the two: about one-
third of the city’s population (0.8 million people) succumbed. In Bengal infection 
loomed large (Maharatna 1996, pp. 159-61).  In Leningrad, by contrast, infectious 
diseases were responsible for few deaths.  Dysentery was inevitable, but there were 
only sporadic outbreaks of typhus and typhoid fever.  Fewer Leningraders died of 
typhoid fever, typhus, and dysentery -- the classic famine diseases in temperate 
  35climates -- in December 1941, at the height of the crisis, than in December 1940, 
before the blockade began (Brojek et al. 1946).   
Several factors contributed to controlling infectious diseases in Leningrad.  
The authorities acted energetically and ruthlessly:  the case of Leningrad is one 
‘where social organization, though sorely tried, nevertheless survives, [so that] 
increased mortality is imputable above all to the ‘direct and final’ consequences of 
starvation rather than to epidemic attacks’ (Livi-Bacci 1991, p. 47).  Advances in 
public health mattered: during the 1921-22 famine epidemic diseases had been 
rampant in Russia, and before 1917 endemic in non-famine conditions.23  Although at 
the height of the crisis, during the winter of 1941/2, the cold weather helped to 
control some diseases (Salisbury 1969, p. 403), the contrast with previous famines is a 
striking one.  Leningrad’s ‘success’ was replicated, though on a much smaller scale, 
in the Warsaw Ghetto, in western Holland in 1944-5, and in Greece (Hionidou 2006, 
pp. 203-18; Ó Gráda 1999, pp. 99-101; Trienekens 2002). 
The pattern just described applies to famines in which relatively developed 
societies faced abnormal conditions.  Public health structures that prevented the 
spread of infectious disease had become part of their daily routine, and continued to 
be so during the war.  In settings like these, where literal starvation accounted for a 
high proportion of deaths, excess mortality is likely to have been both 
proportionately lower, and more class-specific than in earlier famines because, unlike 
infectious diseases such as typhus, starvation always discriminates between rich and 
poor.  In demographic terms, the Soviet famine of 1932-3 may have marked a 
                                                 
23 One of the first actions of the People’s Commissariat of Public Health, established in 1918, was to 
make the notification of infectious diseases compulsory. 
  36transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ insofar as the main causes of death were 
concerned, since typhus and typhoid fever were less common than in 1918-22, and 
cholera did not feature (Davies and Wheatcroft 2004, pp. 430-1; Adamets 2002, pp. 
171-2).   
In sub-Saharan Africa today infectious diseases still loom large during famines 
because they remain endemic in normal times (Salama et al. 2001; Waldman 2001).  In 
the emergency refugee camps of Eastern Sudan in 1985 young children were more 
likely to succumb to measles, malaria, diarrhoea/dysentery, and respiratory 
infections than to starvation (Shears et al.  1987). Cholera struck Somalia and Ethiopia 
in 1985: in the Sudan ‘acute gastroenteritis’ and ‘001’ were the official euphemisms 
for the same disease.   
Although in the past (unlike today) male life expectancy usually exceeded 
female, the evidence for lower female mortality during famines is overwhelming 
(Tomasson 1977, p. 420; Hionidou 2006, p. 165; Macintyre 2002; Maharatna 1996, pp. 
231-34; see too Edgerton-Tarpley 2004; Sami 2002).  The main reason is probably 
physiological: females store proportionately more body fat and less muscle (an 
encumbrance in famine conditions) than males.  Whether the female advantage has 
changed over time remains a moot point: there is some presumption that the more 
important is literal starvation as the cause of death, the greater the female advantage.  
This would imply that during World War II famines women were, in relative terms, at 
less risk in, say, Leningrad and Greece than in Bengal or Vietnam (Ó Gráda 1999, pp. 
101-04; Macintyre 2002). 
  37Most famine victims have always been young children and those beyond 
middle age, although the greatest proportional increases in death rates continue to be 
at ages at least risk in normal times (Pitkänen 1993, pp. 152-63; Roesle 1925; 
Maharatna 1996, p. 168; Ó Gráda 2007).  In contexts where population growth of two 
or three percent per annum is the norm, such age and gender biases in famine 
mortality are unlikely to have much impact, and population growth may be expected 
to quickly fill the resultant demographic vacuum.  Where non-crisis growth is slow, 
these biases may matter more, and post-famine recovery is likely to be slower (Dyson 
and Ó Gráda 2002b, pp. 9-13). 
 
 
III.3. Ambiguities in Measurement 
For several reasons, the demographic consequences of famine are more 
complex than implied by the standard measure of excess mortality.  First, it ignores 
the drop in births that usually accompanies famine.  Second, it omits both the 
rebound in the birth rate and the decline in the death rate that sometimes follow once 
the crisis has passed.  Third, it leaves out of account any longer-run impact on 
mortality and morbidity.  These issues are discussed in turn below. 
 
 
III.3.1. ‘Lost’ Births  
Famines almost invariably entail significant reductions in births and 
marriages.  There is a case for including the births deficit in the demographic 
reckoning.  Mokyr put the number of births lost to the Great Irish Famine at about 0.4 
  38million, whereas estimates for China in the wake of the 1959-61 famine run as high as 
43 million (Mokyr 1980; Yao 1999).  Using 1954-57 as a benchmark, Peng (1987) 
estimates missing births in China in 1959-61 at 25 million.24  The Chinese famine also 
produced significant increases in miscarriages and stillbirths in those years (Cai and 
Feng 2005).  The decline in births during the blockade of Leningrad in 1942 is 
probably unparalleled in history; moreover, during the first half of 1942 two-fifths of 
births were premature, and during the blockade as a whole one delivery in four was 
stillborn or perished within a month (Antonov 1947; Cherepenina 2005, p. 61). 
There are several reasons for such declines in the birth rate.  Lower libido is a 
likely factor, since testosterone levels depend on nutrition (Keys et al. 1950, vol. II, p. 
839).  The decline in libido conserves energy better devoted to seeking food.  A 
further reason is spousal separation: men are more likely to migrate to seek work, 
women in order to beg.  Thirdly, in the 1990s nutritionists identified the link between 
the hormone leptin, which is lacking when food intake is low, and reproductive 
functioning (Frisch 2002).  This sharpened the link proposed by Le Roy Ladurie 
(1969) between reduced body fat deposits and sterility.  Famines also usually entail 
fewer marriages although, clearly, in most situations marriage reductions have 
implications only for first births.   
 
 
                                                 
24 However, using a 1955-58 benchmark yields 20 million ‘lost’ births. 
 
  39III.3.2.   ‘Postponed’ Births and ‘Premature’ Deaths 
The drop in births is often followed by a rebound once the crisis is over (e.g. 
Maharatna 1996, pp. 31-38).  Figure 3 shows this for China in the wake of the Great 
Leap Forward (GLF) famine.  Births in 1962 exceeded those in any year since 1951, 
and in the following three years the birth rate was also higher than in any other year 
in the 1950s and 1960s.  Indeed, the surplus over trend in 1962-65 – insofar as any 
pattern can be detected from these data – far exceeded the deficit in 1960-61.  
Therefore, to some extent at least, the ‘lost’ births seem to have been ‘postponed’ 
births. 
Famines also ‘hasten’ the deaths of some ill and elderly people who would 
have died soon in any case.  The ensuing impact on the demographic structure 
entails a reduction in the death rate in the wake of famines (Dyson and Ó Gráda 
2002b: 10-12; for examples see Lachiver 1991, p. 480; Pitkänen 1993, p. 90).   
 



























     
III.3.3. Long-term Health Effects 
To the extent that standard demographic measures take no account of longer-
term impact of famine on the health of survivors, they underestimate its true cost.  
There is increasing evidence of a link between health and nutrition in utero and in 
early childhood, on the one hand, and adult health and longevity, on the other 
(Barker 1992; Scrimshaw 1996; Doblhammer 2004; van den Berg et al. 2006).  The 
implications for the long-term demographic and health effects of famines are 
obvious.25  Research on Dutch and Chinese data links foetal exposure to famine to 
                                                 
25 True, the evidence is not unanimous.  Kannisto et al. (1997) found no difference between the life 
expectancies of cohorts born before, during, and after the Finnish famine of 1868, and concluded that 
malnutrition before birth and during infancy was unlikely to be ‘crucial’ to adult health, while Painter 
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and from heart disease to antisocial personality disorders and defective teeth (St. 
Clair et al. 2005; Ravelli, Stein, and Susser 1976; Roseboom et al. 2000; Neugebauer, 
Hoek, and Susser 1999; Zhou and Corruccini 1998).  Research in St. Petersburg – 
where famine was much more intense in 1941-43 than in either the Netherlands or 
China – shows that the siege affected the life expectancy of surviving children, the 
main contributory factor being the increased risk of arteriosclerosis (Sparén et al. 
2004; Khoroshinina 2005, p. 208). 
There is evidence too that being born just before or during famines reduces 
expected adult height.  In Leningrad boys aged 10 to 13 years in 1945 were about 8 
cm. smaller than boys of the same age in 1939; the gap for girls was less, but still 
substantial.  Famine also reduced the adult heights of those who were children 
during the GLF famine (Kozlov and Samsonova 2005, pp. 189-89; Khoroshinina 2005, 
pp. 198-200; Gørgens, Meng, and Vaithianathan 2005; Morgan 2006).26  Such evidence 
suggests that the human cost of famines has been underestimated in the past.  
Finally, there is the further disturbing possibility – still unexplored – that famine-
induced malnutrition in utero or early childhood placed the mental development of 
affected populations at risk.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
(2005) could establish no connection between exposure to famine conditions in Holland in 1944-45 and 
life expectancy to age 57 years.   
26 Further corroborative evidence of the connection between deprivation in childhood and adult 
height is provided by Reher and Quiñones (2003), who examine the impact of losing a parent in 
childhood -- a common occurrence during famines -- on adult height in Spain.   
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IV. A Brief Re-examination of Major Recent Famines 
 
This section focuses on three of the most important and controversial of 
twentieth-century famines in the light of the above discussion.  Two -- in the former 
Soviet Union in the early 1930s and in China in 1959-61 -- are closely linked to 
totalitarian regimes.  The third, the Great Bengali Famine of 1943-44, is familiar to 
economists through the classic work of Sen (1981). 
 
 
IV.1. Stalin’s Famines: 
The Soviet famine of 1932-33 is one of several notorious twentieth-century 
‘totalitarian’ famines.  Denied or downplayed at the time by the regime, it has been 
the subject of heated controversy (Engerman 2000).27  Outside accounts, culminating 
in Robert Conquest’s passionate and influential study, tended to place exclusive 
emphasis on human agency, holding that the ‘harvest of sorrow’ was deliberately 
engineered and politically motivated, particularly against Ukrainians (Conquest 
1987).  Recent scholarship regards it instead as the outcome of a political struggle 
between a ruthless regime bent on rapid industrialization and an exploited and 
uncooperative peasantry (Davies and Wheatcroft 2003, pp. 431-41).  The traditional 
verdict has been revised in several ways.   
                                                 
27 The response of the late James Mace to recent research on the famine is indicative: ‘The issue is 
precisely one of Holocaust denial. Change the people, the place, and the time, but the issue remains 
the same: millions of people dead for political ends’ (cited in The Ukrainian Weekly, LXX(28), July 14, 
2002). 
 
  43First, although the historiography has focused largely on the Ukraine, the 
crisis straddled a much larger area stretching from the northern Caucuses to the 
Urals.  Worst hit of all was Kazakhstan (e.g. Tauger 2001; Ellman 2002; Davies and 
Wheatcroft 2004). 
Second, Ukrainian nationalists have long claimed that the famine ‘was 
designed and implemented by the Soviet regime as a deliberate act of terror and 
mass murder against the Ukrainian people’.28  Davies and Wheatcroft (2003) and 
Tauger (1998; 2001) find evidence for intent lacking, but blame Stalin and his 
henchmen for prioritizing the balance of payments29 and fast-track industrialization 
over preventing mass deaths.  Without collectivization and excessive grain 
procurements, and the associated repression through the Gulag system, the famine 
would have been much less severe (Khlevniuk 2004, pp. 54-82).30   
Third, there was a FAD dimension: the grain harvests of both 1931 and 1932 
were genuinely poor.  Davies and Wheatcroft blame this mainly on collectivization 
and excessive procurements, while Tauger places more stress on adverse weather 
conditions and plant diseases (Davies et al. 1994; Davies and Wheatcroft 2003; Tauger 
1998, 2001, 2004).  Grain procurements were lower in 1932/33 than in any year after 
1929/30 (Davies et al. 1994, p. 290; Tauger 2004, p. 438).  However, rural consumption 
may have been even less in 1932/3 than in 1931/2.  The increase in procurements 
                                                 
28  A resolution to this effect was passed unanimously by the U.S. House of Representatives on 20 
October 2003. 
29 Grain exports in 1932/3 totalled 1.6 million tons, i.e. about 9 percent of procurements and 3 percent 
of output.  
30 However, Ellman provocatively adds, there was nothing unique in the focus on targets other than 
famine relief: in 1943 the British government in India ‘was more interested in the war effort than in 
saving the life of Bengalis’ (Ellman 2002). But see too Ellman (2005) and Davies and Wheatcroft (2006). 
  44between 1928/29 and 1932/33 outstripped the growth of the urban population, so 
the crisis was mainly a rural one (Allen 2003, pp. 106-07). 
Fourth, fear and repression distorted information flows.  In early July 1932 
Moscow’s representatives at Party meetings in the Ukraine ‘categorically refused’ the 
reductions in planned procurements demanded by the Ukrainian leadership.  As late 
as 25 July 1932 Stalin (on vacation in the south) believed that harvest prospects were 
‘undoubtedly good for the USSR as a whole’, while acknowledging problems in the 
Ukraine and Transcaucasia.  Three weeks later the Politburo accepted his proposal to 
‘slash…an average of 50 percent off the plan’ for the worst-affected collective farms 
(Davies et al. 2003, pp. 155-56, 167-68).  In the wake of the collectivization drives of 
1929-30, the authorities and the peasantry engaged in an unequal and ultimately 
deadly game in which the Moscow suspected the peasants of concealing grain, while 
the peasantry in turn employed the strategy of exaggerating local privation 
(Fitzpatrick 1994, pp. 69-74). 
Fifth, the famine brought an escalation of protest, crime, and civil disorder, 
culminating in Stalin’s draconian law of August 7 1932 against the theft of socialist 
property (Davies el al. 2003, pp. 14-15, 105; Fitzpatrick 1994, p. 73); attempted mass 
migration to urban areas (Davies et al. 2003, p. 105), and even instances of 
cannibalism (Davies and Wheatcroft 2003, pp. 421-24; compare Patenaude 2002, pp. 
262-70).  
Sixth, the authorities engaged in famine relief to a greater extent than 
previously thought (Tauger 2001; Davies and Wheatcroft 2003, pp. 424-25, 440-41).  
  45Far too late, they adjusted planned procurements in the worst affected regions 
downwards, and relaxed restrictions on private trade.    
Finally, the 1933, 1934, and 1935 harvests were good.  Recovery from famine 
conditions thus came relatively fast, and living standards were higher on the eve of 
World War 231 than before collectivization (Allen 2003: 132-52).  Birth-weight and 
height data capture the immediate and long-term effects of the famine, though they 
also suggest that World War II bore even more heavily on the population as a whole 
than the ‘years of hunger’ (Wheatcroft 1999). 
 
 
IV.2. Bengal, 1942-44 
Sen’s classic Poverty and Famines (1981) has ensured the Great Bengali Famine 
a special place in the historiography of famine.  The famine was the product of 
wartime conditions.  The fall of Rangoon meant that the supply of Burmese rice, 
albeit normally a small fraction of total needs, was cut off; fears of a Japanese 
invasion led to a series of measures (such as the requisition of rice stores in coastal 
areas and the destruction of shipping that might fall into enemy hands) that 
provoked panic and speculation; and the authorities worried about the military 
implications of declaring a famine (Knight 1954; Sen 1981, ch. 6; Greenough 1982; 
Bayly and Harper 2004).   
                                                 
31 Living standards in both rural and urban areas were lower than before collectivization, but the 
relative size of the urban population was much bigger.  I am grateful to Stephen Wheatcroft for this 
point. 
  46Although wartime inflation lifted all prices during 1942, in Bengal the rise in 
the price of rice was disproportionate and greater than elsewhere in India.  
Individual provinces had the power to prevent the movement of food, and as one 
senior Bihari official confided to the Viceroy: ‘By conviction I hold with Adam Smith 
but in a crisis like this I am prepared to accept 100% control’ (Mansergh 1971, p. 414).  
Attempts at controlling prices at unrealistically low levels in an order to ‘break the 
Calcutta market’ were ineffective (Bhatia 1967, p. 327).  Faced with more ‘manifestly 
speculative buying’, in early 1943 the authorities abolished price controls in order to 
secure supplies.  They remained convinced that there was enough food available; the 
problem was to ‘liquify’ hoarded rice and guarantee its ‘equitable distribution’ (Star 
of India, May 12th 1943).  Despite official appeals to speculators, prices continued to 
rise – a maund (about 82 lbs.) of rice costing about 5 rupees on the eve of the crisis, 
cost 9 rupees in January 1943, 21 rupees in April, and 30 rupees in July (Maharatna 
1996, Appendix D).32  
The relative importance of such factors, on the one hand, and natural events, 
on the other, remains controversial.  In mid-October 1942 much of coastal west 
Bengal, including important rice-growing areas, was hit by a cyclone that resulted in 
considerable loss of life and the destruction of standing crops, livestock, and paddy 
stores.  Moreover, the aus (summer) rice crop of 1942 was poor, and there were 
rumours in November 1942 that a mysterious disease had struck the aman (winter) 
crop, which normally accounted for three quarters of total rice output.  
                                                 
32 If the price of rice is deflated by the cost of living, then its real cost doubled between late 1942 and 
mid-1943.  Such an increase is mild compared to, say, that in potato prices in Ireland in 1846-47 or in 
wheat in France in 1708-09. 
  47Sen’s reappraisal of the size of the 1942-43 harvest supported the majority 
verdict of the Famine Inquiry Commission that there was enough rice in Bengal to 
feed everybody for most of 1943 (Sen 1981; Famine Inquiry Commission 1945: 13-15; 
see too Greenough 1982, pp. 286-980).  Two factors complicate any assessment of 
supplies, however.  First, the underlying crop estimates were based on ‘eye’ 
estimates of the standing crop, and offered only a rough guide to the harvest 
(Mahalanobis et al. 1946).  The second, related caveat is whether crop data adequately 
capture the impact of a fungus that attacked the rice crop just prior to the harvest.  
Tauger (2003) has re-drawn attention to the devastating impact of the fungus on 
yields at two crop research stations located some thirty kilometres apart in 1942: how 
prevalent the problem was is unknown.  Although plant pathologists have 
highlighted the role of plant disease, historians tend to dismiss or ignore it (e.g. 
Padmanabhan 1941; Carefoot and Sprott 1969: 179; Dasgupta 1984).33  Political 
opinion during the crisis was divided as to the severity of a shortage of foodgrains: 
government spokesmen tended to blame hoarding, while opposition spokesmen 
claimed that this ‘minimized the gravity of the situation’ (Batabyal 2005, pp. 106-7).   
If further research sustains Tauger’s claim that plant disease was widespread, then 
the conventional wisdom that the famine was ‘market-made’ or ‘man-made’ will 
need revision.  It would be ironic if the paradigmatic case-study for the 
unimportance of FAD turned out to be a case of FAD, although a harvest shortfall on 
                                                 
33 A key policymaker also mentioned ‘the failure of the main rice crop’ and ‘reports of widespread 
disease in the incoming crop’, although ‘one was inclined to suspect that the reports might be 
exaggerated by speculators’ (Pinnell 2002, pp. 94, 97).   
  48the scale of, say, Ireland in the 1840s or even the Soviet Union in 1931-32 is unlikely 
(Basu 1984; Bowbrick 1986; Goswami 1990; Dyson 1996, p. 74 fn21).   
Both British officialdom and the colonial authorities blamed the unfolding 
crisis at first on hoarders, and the official inquiry into the Bengali famine found that 
the huge rise in rice prices was due to more than market fundamentals: ‘It was the 
result of the belief of the producers, traders, and consumers at the end of 1942 and 
the beginning of 1943 that an ever-increasing rise in prices was inevitable and could 
not be prevented…’  The rise in food prices was ’more than the natural result of the 
shortage of supply that had occurred’.  Bhatia refers to ‘the prevailing psychosis of 
shortage’, and blames the authorities for exacerbating the situation.  He instances the 
Bengali Government’s request that people keep two-month stocks of foodgrains in 
their homes, which was probably interpreted as a warning that people would have to 
rely on their own resources in the event of famine (Famine Inquiry Commission 1945, 
p. 80; Bhatia 1967, pp. 324-26).  Sen’s conclusion that the famine was due in large part 
to 'speculative withdrawal and panic purchase of rice stocks... encouraged by 
administrative chaos’ tallies with the claim made by the official inquiry into the 
famine that forcible procurement of hoards might have worked (Bhatia 1967, pp. 323-
4; Sen 1981, p. 76).  
L.G. Pinnell, the official charged with managing food supplies in Bengal 
during the crisis, at first tried a combination of price controls and measures to ‘bring 
out any hidden surpluses’, but the lack of results convinced him that ‘holding back’ 
by traders was not the primary cause of the famine.  During the spring of 1943 
Pinnell offered a reward for evidence of ‘any concealed stock successfully disclosed 
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although a minimum reward of 2,500 rupees was ‘not a small sum for a common 
informer’.  This was not to deny the role of hoarding:  myriad hoards, ‘individually 
small but collectively ruinous in a year of shortage’, were held more out of fear than 
greed.  Pinnell later regretted his own failure in late 1942 to emphasise the point ‘that 
there was definitely going to be a shortage in Bengal’ instead of pinning hopes on the 
presence of carry-over stocks (Pinnell: 2002, pp. 94-100; Ó Gráda 2007).  Official 
attitudes in London also shifted, and the role of maladministration, sectional 
interests, and the harvest were conceded. 
The worsening crisis resulted in an increasing death toll in the countryside 
and in the arrival of thousands of starving migrants in Calcutta.  The famine’s 
incidence was very uneven, both regionally and socio-economically.  The authorities 
delayed declaring a famine in the belief that grain supplies were imminent and 
because they were pursuing a policy of ‘creating confidence’.  The prospect of a good 
aman crop in November 1943 and a drop in the price of rice (15 rupees in December 
1943) prompted most surviving migrants to return home.  Only in late 1943 was the 
crisis brought under control. 
 
 
IV.3. China 1959-61 
Academic estimates of excess mortality in China in 1959-61, which range from 
15 million to 43 million, rely on data released by the Chinese authorities in the early 
1980s (Ashton et al. 1984; Houser, Sands, and Xiao 2005).  The quality of those data 
  50has been questioned, but since their release was part of the official effort to discredit 
Maoist policies, they are unlikely to downplay the tragedy.  The evidential basis for 
wilder estimates such as ‘figures of fifty and sixty million deaths…cited at internal 
meetings of senior Party officials’ (Becker 1996, pp. 266-74, 293) is very flimsy.  
A careful estimate by Peng (1987) put excess mortality at 23 million; more recently 
Yao (1999) has proposed a figure of 18 million.  However, all estimates are very 
sensitive to assumed non-crisis vital rates (Riskin 1998, pp. 112-14).   The aggregate 
crude death rate for 1950-69 is shown in Figure 1 (data from Mitchell 1995, pp. 71, 
73).  Fitting these data to a polynomial in time and time-squared with dummies for 
the crisis years 1959-61 translates into an estimated cumulative excess death rate of 
23 per thousand.  Assuming a population of 650 million on the eve of the 1959-61 
famine implies a toll of about 15 million (see too Houser, Sands, and Xiao 2005: Table 
3).  This would still almost certainly make the 1959-61 famine the biggest in history in 
absolute terms.   
  This estimate bears comparison with the estimated toll of famine in 1877-78 – 
9.5 million to 13 million – when China’s population was only one-half its 1960 level 
and real GDP per head was higher than in the 1950s.34  In the same period famine in 
India caused a further seven million deaths (Davis 2001, pp. 111, 113; Maddison 
2006).  Aggregate famine mortality in China between 1900 and 1949 was 10.5 million 
to 13.5 million (Devereux 2000: Table 1; see also Buck 1937, pp. 124-28). 35  
                                                 
34  According to Maddison (2006) Chinese GDP per head, measured in 1990 international dollars, was 
$530 in 1870, $552 in 1913, and $439 in 1950.  GDP per head was $630 in Ethiopia/Eritrea in 1973, $578 
in 1990.  It was $1,706 in the United Kingdom in 1820. 
35 Adding Devereux’s estimates for 1920-21, 1927, 1929, and 1943. 
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studied of modern famines (e.g. Bernstein 1983; Kueh 1984, 1995; Peng 1987; Lin 
1990; Riskin 1998; Yao 1999; Lin and Yang 2000; Cai and Feng 2005; Wei and Yang 
2005; Houser, Sands, and Xiao 2005).   Footprints of its severity may be found in the 
lower average height and higher incidence of adult schizophrenia in the generation 
born just before or during it (Gørfens, Meng and Vaithianathan 2005; St. Clair et al. 
2005).  Its human cost, almost certainly the highest of any famine ever, and the 
relative importance of exogenous factors and human agency, remain highly 
controversial issues.  The extent of public action to minimise deaths and the 
proximate causes of deaths remain uncertain.   
The famine coincided with the Great Leap Forward, and the two events were 
undoubtedly linked.  Like Stalin’s First Five Year Plan, the GLF introduced policies 
that diverted labour and capital from agriculture; put a premium on confusing 
signals between Beijing and the provinces; and wasted scarce food (e.g. Lin 1990; Yao 
1999). That FAD was a factor is not in doubt:  grain production was 15 percent less 
than its 1958 peak in 1959, and 28 percent less in 1960; the declines in net rural supply 
after requisitioning were even greater, 23 and 29 percent, respectively.  In remote and 
backward Sichuan the cumulative losses in grain output in 1959 and 1960 relative to 
1958 were a devastating 70 percent; they were 59 percent in Guizhou and 64 percent 
in Liaoning.  Wei and Yang (2005), linking the famine to the failure of central 
                                                 
36 An émigré leftist critic of the Maoist leadership deems the famine remarkable for the lack of grain 
riots, peasant rebellion, grain hoarding, and sales of women and children -- all ‘normal occurrences’ 
during earlier Chinese famines.  He also notes that the disaster never threatened the authorities′ ability 
to maintain law and order (Han 2003).  
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labour from the countryside account for three-fifths of the decline in output which 
led to the famine.   
An alternative interpretation argues that the combination of extreme weather, 
bad policy, and economic backwardness proved lethal in 1959-61.  Although Cold 
War accounts tend to ignore or deny the impact of the weather on harvests,37 the 
evidence for severe weather in China in 1959-60 seems compelling.  Tree-ring 
analysis suggests that at Huashan (in Shaanxi province, central China) rainfall in 
April-July 1960 was probably lower than in all years, or almost all years, between 
1600 and 1988.  Instrumental data from Huashan meteorological station confirm the 
lack of rainfall in 1960, and the records of other stations make it likely that these 
months were among the driest for that time of year for centuries over a larger region 
of north-Central China (Hughes et al. 1994).  More impressionistic accounts 
corroborate such data (Smith 1960, p. 26; Han 2003; MacFarquhar 1983, p. 322; Dwyer 
1974, pp. 262-4; Kueh 1995, p.  229fn20).   
Wei and Yang (2005) constructed their own index of weather conditions on the 
basis of retrospective interviews.  Their econometric results are quite sensitive to this 
index: using official Chinese weather proxies instead reduces the impact of their 
policy variables to insignificance.  Their claim that official data may have been 
tampered with in order to maximise the role of exogenous factors does not square 
with Kueh’s verdict that Chinese data are not subject to bias (1995, p. 290).  Why, 
moreover, should Chinese demographic and agricultural statistics be deemed 
                                                 
37 Thus Becker (1996, p. 273) asserted that ‘there were no unusual floods or droughts’ in this period. 
  53satisfactory, but not meteorological data?  The precise impact of the weather on 
output requires further study; in the meantime, Kueh claims that a simple weather 
index can account for 72 percent of the yield shortfall in 1960 and 107 percent of the 
shortfall in 1961 (Kueh 1984, pp. 80-81; see too Kueh 1995).   Moreover, provincial 
mortality data suggest that the GLF famine was regionally very uneven. Two 
traditionally famine-prone provinces, Sichuan in the south-west and Anhui in center-
east, accounted for nearly half of all deaths but only one-sixth of the pre-famine 
population.38   
These considerations suggest roles for regional income and proportionate crop 
loss in accounting for the toll of the GLF famine.  Indeed, measures of regional 
output (YPOP) and of proportionate crop loss (PROPLOSS) alone account for two-
fifths of the variation in excess mortality (RELDR), and an even higher proportion of 
the variation in the birth rate (RELBR), across twenty-four of China’s provinces in 
1959-61.  This suggests that economic backwardness and bad weather mattered.  We 
find: 39
 
[1]  RELDR  =   1.455       - 0.0037YPOP      + 1.767PROPLOSS 
        (0.216)       (0.0009)       (0.378) 
 
  N  =  24; R2  =  0.412; robust standard errors in parentheses 
  
                                                 
38 Based on provincial population data in Chen (1967, Table 1.8). On Anhui see Bernstein 1983; Becker 
1997.  
39 The underlying regional output (representing the average for 1953-57) and excess mortality data 
were taken from National Bureau of Statistics (1999) and MacFarquhar (1997, Appendix 1), 
respectively.  Replacing YPOP by agriculture’s share of GDP in 1957 also yields very similar results. 
The excess mortality is defined as the excess death rate in 1959-61, using the average of 1957 and 1958 
rates as a base. 
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[2]   RELBR  =   0.632      + 0.00119YPOP     - 0.533PROPLOSS 
        (0.062)      (0.0004)               (0.127) 
 




The implied elasticities of the relative death and birth rates to income per head are  
-0.5 and +0.4, respectively.  The outcome suggests a crisis as readily explained by 
geography and history as by politics. 
The likely role of adverse weather and economic backwardness does not 
absolve the Chinese leadership of blame, however:  the authorities might have saved 
millions of lives by acknowledging the extent of the disaster in public and appealing 
for foreign aid in 1959 and 1960 – although such an appeal would have been 
unprecedented and out of character.  Moreover, given the demands made on the 
countryside during the GLF, there would have been problems even if the weather 
had been normal (Kueh 1995, Ch. 11). 
Little is known about the mechanics of mortality in 1959-61.  The relative 
economic backwardness of China -- where diseases such as typhoid fever, scarlet 
fever, typhus, and tuberculosis were rife before 1949 -- would suggest infectious 
diseases as the predominant cause, yet most accounts of the famine emphasize 
starvation rather than disease (e.g. Becker 1997).  By implication the GLF famine was, 
in terms of our earlier discussion, a ‘modern’ famine.   However, on the eve of the 
famine life expectancy was low (39.3 years in 1950-55) and infant mortality high (195 
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personal hygiene have had such a dramatic effect within the space of a few years?41  
The issue requires further investigation.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In later editions of the Essay on Population, Malthus excluded few places from 
famine’s past ravages.  Not even the ‘shepherds of the North of Europe’ were safe, 
and the massive famines of the 1690s in France, Scotland, and Finland, 1708-09 in 
France, and 1740-1 in Ireland highlight the importance of famine in early modern 
Europe (Malthus 1992; compare Fogel 2004, pp. 5-6).42  Elsewhere, with the possible 
exception of the New World, famines seem to have been more common, although the 
demographic record is thin.43  
                                                 
40 UN Demographic Yearbook 1997: Historical Supplement (available at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dybhist.htm). 
41 The evidence for dramatic improvements in the early 1950s in Campbell (2001) is striking, but refers 
to the Beijing region only. 
42 Fogel’s claim, based on English data, assumes that all mortality peaks above trend were famine-
driven.  By making no allowance for outbreaks of disease, then (as long as the under-registration of 
mortality during crises was not disproportionate) his measure provides an upper-bound estimate of 
famine mortality.  France yields a somewhat different outcome (Chevet and Ó Gráda 2002, pp. 709-
10).   
43 Thus, data culled from the T’u-shu chi-ch’eng (Complete Collection of Illustrations and Books) – e.g. 610 
years of drought between the founding of the T’ang and the end of the Ming dynasties (618-1662AD) – 
are often invoked to convey the endemic character of famine in China (Nathan 1965, p. 1).  History is 
prone to ‘forget’ famines in the more distant past.  Thus the volume of the Cambridge History of India 
covering the 1750-1970 period contains a four-page chronology of famines, while that covering the 
previous 550 years contains a single paragraph on famines in south India. 
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industrialised extensions, Latin America, and Japan were virtually famine-free, and 
today major, prolonged famine anywhere is conceivable only in contexts of endemic 
warfare or blockade.  Compared to the persistent effects of HIV/AIDS on the 
population of sub-Saharan Africa the damage wrought by famine is minimal (Table 
5; compare de Waal and Whiteside 2003).  Moreover, given that throughout most of 
history land hunger has been a powerful predictor of famine, recent trends in the 
balance between population and food offer room for cautious optimism about the 
near future.  FAO data show that in both Asia and Latin America food production 
has grown much faster than population since the 1960s.  In sub-Saharan Africa the 
balance has been much closer, although the problem there has been very rapid 
population growth rather than sluggish food output growth.  Moreover, some 
African countries such as Burkina Faso and Niger have walked a high demographic 
tightrope while others (e.g. Malawi and Zimbabwe) have performed poorly despite 
slower population growth.  China’s performance since the late 1970s, with 
population growth tapering off and the rate of food output growth accelerating, is 
particularly striking. 
 
Table 5. Life Expectancy in Selected African Countries, 1970 and 2003 
Country 1970  2003 
    
(a) Famine-prone     
Niger  37 46 
Mali  38 49 
Ethiopia  41 46 
    
(b) HIV/Aids-affected     
South Africa  53 47 
  57Botswana  55 39 




The few remaining countries still vulnerable to textbook Malthusian famine 
have experienced considerable improvements in life expectancy in recent decades 
(see Table 1), but they lag behind in terms of fertility decline.  Niger, whose total 
fertility rate (at 8.0 in 2003) is highest in the world and infant mortality (about 150 per 
thousand live births) about second highest, is a striking example.  A key issue is how 
the fertility transition, scarcely yet underway, unfolds in such vulnerable economies. 
The experience of post-transition economies worldwide is that declines in fertility 
were preceded by declines in mortality (Reher 2004).  However, the length of the lag 
and the extent of the fertility decline are clearly crucial.  A guarded historical lesson 
for countries like Niger is that the transition, once underway, has been more rapid in 
latecomers than in pioneers.44   
Africa’s laggard fertility transition, itself a function of economic 
underdevelopment, has increased its share of global population from only 8.8 
percent in 1950 to 14 percent today; it is set to reach 21.7 percent by 2050.  Even 
though a drop in the annual growth rate from 2.5 percent during the past half-
century to 1.4 percent during the next in Africa as a whole is implied, population is 
predicted to treble by 2050 in famine-prone countries such as Niger, Uganda, and 
                                                 
44 In Niger infant mortality has fallen significantly since the 1970s and life expectancy has risen, but the 
Total Fertility Rate  remains stubbornly high. 
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disproportionately on the productivity of arid lands limited to a short growing 
season, the implied threat to living standards is clear (Dyson 2001, 2005). 
A few decades ago economies sustaining population growth rates of 3 percent 
or more on slender resources were much more vulnerable to famine than they are 
today.  Today, world public opinion alone may not eliminate underdevelopment but, 
unless civil strife intervenes, it can prevent harvest deficits from producing mass 
mortality.   
The term ‘famine’ is an emotive one, to be used cautiously.  On the one hand, 
pre-emptive action requires agreement on famine’s early warning signs; the very 
declaration of a ‘famine’ may prevent it from becoming a major mortality crisis.  On 
the other, overuse of the term by relief agencies and others may lead to cynicism and 
donor fatigue.  In the recent past some definitions of ‘famine’ have included events 
and processes which would not qualify as famine in the catastrophic, biblical sense 
(Howe and Devereux 2004).  The last such ‘biblical’ famine was probably the 
Ethiopian famine of 1984-5.  More recent famines have been smaller events, more 
restricted in place and time.  Most have been ‘man-made’ rather than the result of 
poor harvests; where harvest failure has been the main cause, as in Niger in 2005, 
food aid materialized and kept mortality low.  Such changes have prompted John 
Seaman (1993, p. 31) to describe the likelihood of major famine today, even in sub-
                                                 
45 According to the latest UN low variant long-range projection 
(http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/pop918.doc.htm). 
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